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Policy  makers  use  several  international  indices  that  characterize  countries  according  to  the
quality  of  their  institutions.  However,  no effort  has  been  made  to  study  how  the honesty  of
citizens varies  across  countries.  This  paper explores  the  honesty  among  citizens  across  16
countries with  1440  participants.  We employ  a very  simple  task  where  participants  face  a
trade-off  between  the joy  of eating  a ﬁne  chocolate  and  the  disutility  of  having  a threatened
self-concept  because  of  lying.  Despite  the  incentives  to cheat,  we  ﬁnd  that  individuals  areonesty
orruption
ultural differences
mostly honest.  Further,  international  indices  that  are  indicative  of  institutional  honesty  are
completely  uncorrelated  with  citizens’  honesty  for our sample  countries.
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1. Introduction
Imagine yourself on a university campus. You see the following announcement: “Is this your lucky day? Flip a coin and win
a Chocolate”.  You approach the desk and receive the opportunity to win a delicious and beautifully wrapped Lindt Lindor
chocolate trufﬂe by ﬂipping a coin with a black and a white side. You ﬂip the coin in a box at a nearby table; the box protects
your anonymity. You win  a chocolate if you report that the white side came up and nothing if you report black. If you actually
rolled black, the only thing keeping you from enjoying the trufﬂe is your moral compass. You face a tradeoff between the
joy of eating a ﬁne chocolate and the individual disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. There is no
social shaming or ostracism. We  ran this experiment (three treatments) in 16 countries to test how some regular citizens
around the world behave in such a situation. Interestingly, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant differences across an otherwise
very heterogeneous set of countries.
Most studies about cultural differences regarding dishonest behavior have used the survey methodology. Transparency
International reports large differences in corruption around the world and the World Value Survey documents cross-cultural
differences in opinions regarding how “justiﬁable” it is to cheat on taxes or public transportation fares. However, corruption
indices measure perceptions and not actual behaviors. Further, variations across countries in academic dishonesty (Rawwas
et al., 2004) and tax evasion (Alm et al., 1995; Cummings et al., 2009) reinforce the impression that cheating is both abundant
and diverse around the world. In the same line, recent research in behavioral and experimental economics has shown that
a large fraction of individuals are prone to cheating (Ariely, 2012; Gneezy, 2005). An exception to this trend is Abeler et al.
(2014) who report a phone-based incentivized experiment with a representative sample in Germany. They ﬁnd that most
people report honestly after ﬂipping a coin in absolute privacy with a 50% chance of getting a payoff of 15 euros in cash or
through an Amazon gift certiﬁcate. Abeler and colleagues also complemented their study with a laboratory experiment and
ﬁnd that there is a slightly higher level of dishonest reporting in this setting.
The dominant view in the literature is that individuals engage in dishonest behavior as long as they can maintain a
positive self-image while obtaining the maximum payoffs from their dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008). Further, research has
shown that creating a justiﬁcation of a positive self-image while behaving dishonestly is context speciﬁc (Fosgaard et al.,
2013; Gino and Galinsky, 2012; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013).
In this paper, we examine precisely this. That is, whether cheating per se differs across different countries and whether
the context1 inﬂuences this behavior. We  conducted an experiment in which participants reported the outcome of a coin
toss to win a prize. We  replicated the experiment in a diverse set of 16 countries around the world with 1440 subjects, 90
in each country (30 per treatment). We  used a simple cheating task based on Bucciol and Piovesan (2011). We  took great
care to run each session under similar conditions. The location of the experiment was always a busy common areas on
university campuses (see Table 1 for an overview). Participants had to ﬂip a black/white coin; if the outcome was reported
white, they obtained a red Lindt Lindor Trufﬂe; if reported black, they obtained nothing. As our sample includes substantial
cultural variation – including participants from Anglo-Saxon, Latin, Germanic, Nordic and Asiatic countries – one would
expect substantial heterogeneity in cheating. In addition, and consistent with a social constructionist view, the effects of
culture depend on the speciﬁcs of the choice context (Gelfand et al., 2013; Kramer and Messick, 1995).
In the ﬁrst treatment (the Self-Reported Treatment, SRT) each participant ﬂipped a coin in a private area without the
presence of the researchers or other participants. Afterwards the subject ﬁlled a report sheet – indicating sex and the
white/black coin-toss result. It was clearly indicated that the ﬁlled form should be left in the box nearby. No interaction with
the experimenters occurred in this task.
Taking into account that there are heterogenous types of dishonest people (Gneezy et al., 2013), this task is a good
measure of dishonesty for several reasons. Firstly, as a growing body of research suggests that in completely anonymous
settings, where the risk of being caught is inexistent, ﬁnding 100% cheating is not unusual (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013; Shu
et al., 2012), however, people may  also restrict the amount of cheating (Ayal and Gino, 2011; Gneezy, 2005).
In our task there is no possibility to restrict the amount of cheating, the decision is simply to be honest or not (report
black or white). Further, decision making is immediate and intuitive, instead of deliberative and meditative in a cognitive
dual system (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011; Kahneman, 2011). In our experiment, cheating is an automatic response and
the need for justiﬁcation matters only when people have enough time to deliberate (Shalvi et al., 2012). Finally, the reward
is a simple chocolate that gives instant gratiﬁcation.
The two other treatments were the Written and the Verbal Reported Treatments (WRT and VRT, respectively). In WRT,
participants completed a report sheet in private and submitted it to the experimenter. The experimenter made a note of the
reported outcome, and, if due, handed the chocolate to the participant. In VRT, participants were not asked to ﬁll any form.
They verbally reported the outcome of the coin ﬂip to the experimenter. If reported white, the experimentalist handed a
chocolate to them.Our different treatments allow us to understand how the level of cheating is shaped by context, i.e. the differences in
reporting across treatments. Building on the theory of self-image maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008), we  predict that our
three treatments will have different implications with regard to the moral processes of reporting incorrect outcomes. We
1 The context deﬁnes the strength of the moral compass in our experiment.
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Table  1
Summary of countries studied.
Country City University
Austria Linz Johannes Kepler University Linz
Belgium Brussels Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)
Colombia Bogotá Universidad de los Andes
Denmark Copenhagen Copenhagen University
Finland Oulu University of Oulu
Germany Nuremberg University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Greece Rethymno University of Crete
India Delhi Hansraj College, University of Delhi
Indonesia Salatiga Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana
Italy Padova Università di Padova
Japan Tokyo Waseda University
Netherlands Utrecht Utrecht University
Spain Madrid Universidad Autónoma Madrid
Turkey Istanbul Bahc¸ es¸ ehir Üniversitesi
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onjecture that misreporting in the SRT is the least morally difﬁcult decision since reporting does not involve any kind of
ocial interaction and, subsequently, no social pressure from the experimenter. Consequently, the decision to be dishonest is
nly a tradeoff between the internal moral pressure (and the consequent guilt experienced) against the pleasure of enjoying
 Lindt chocolate.
In WRT, an additional moral pressure originates from the fact that the decision is documented on paper and handed to
nother person. This additional social process is likely to involve shame (on top of guilt) in case of dishonesty, and hence
e expect less dishonesty occurring in this treatment. Relative to verbal reports, we  conjecture that written reports are
ore distant and make it easier to take away internal moral control (Shu et al., 2012). Therefore, we  expect the VRT to bring
ven stronger self-image erosion in case of cheating, since the untruthful decision now must be stated face-to-face. In this
ituation we expect the most moral pressure to be present and hence the least dishonest behavior. This is consistent with
andura et al. (1996) who ﬁnd that verbal reports are likely to be less prone to dishonest behavior than written reports.
iven this we hypothesize that self-reporting with no interaction (with the experimenter) increase the temptation to be
ishonest.
. Experimental design
We  replicate a simple coin task by Bucciol and Piovesan (2011). As noted before, participants had to ﬂip a black/white
oin. If the reported toss was white they obtained a red Lindt Lindor chocolate and nothing otherwise.
At ﬁrst glance, the choice of chocolate as an incentive might seem as unusual compared to the conventional choice
f money. We believe that chocolates are a good solution for studying decision-making across countries, given that our
tudy is in a ﬁeld setting and not in the laboratory. In fact, we believe that it is advantageous to tell students you have
 chance of winning a chocolate, rather than telling them you have a chance to win a dollar (or any corresponding local
urrency). Consuming a small snack in such a situation is simply much more of an everyday event, and hence feels more
atural. And a more natural setting enables greater experimenter control and external validity. Furthermore, a chocolate is
 chocolate anywhere, and subjects never have to calculate the monetary value of the good, just receive a small delicious
nack. Clearly, there are many other potential incentive approaches one could apply. A monetary prize could be scaled based
n Big Mac  prizes, GDP, or any purchasing power index. Although there might be country differences in chocolate preference
as indicated by Messerli, 2012), the choice of chocolate as payment constitutes just as many or just as few concerns as any
ther cross-country payment vehicle, including country-adjusted monetary compensations. Another possible concern is the
ery small size of the incentive. We  acknowledge the small size, yet we  want to emphasize that considering the extremely
hort duration of the experiment (perhaps 1 or 2 min), our payment translates into an hourly payment similar to what is
sed in most laboratory studies.
Our participants are university students.2 The coin was ﬂipped only once and by one person at a time. The task was
erformed in a private area at a safe distance from the experimenters or other participants. The location of the experiment
as within the college/university campus, for example, in a hallway in the cafeteria area, hence ensuring a steady ﬂow of
otential participants. To ensure that we do study country differences, we ensured that only native people participated in
he various locations. The importance of ensuring this is supported by evidence of the effect of immigrants’ original country
2 Recent papers show that typical experimental subjects are not really different from ordinary people (see for instance Exadaktylos et al., 2013 for social
ilemmas).
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social norms in ethical behavior (Kountouris and Remoundou, 2013). The experiment was  carried out in the local working
language for both the verbal and the written part.3
The whole study comprises three different treatments according to the level of proximity between the participant and
the experimenter:
• Self-Reported Treatment (SRT): A student approached the experimenter (at table A, see Figure A1 in the appendix for
details), he/she was handed a report sheet, and was  guided to table B (far enough away from the researcher area) to ﬂip
the black/white coin privately (see B in Fig. A1). The coin ﬂip was carried out inside a small cardboard box to make it truly
private. The student noted gender and the result of the coin ﬂip on the report sheet at table B. After ﬁlling out the report
sheet, the student walked over to a third table (table C in another private area at a distance from the experimenter, see C
in Fig. A1) to deposit the report sheet in a box, and to take the chocolate him/herself in case of a white toss.
• Written Reported Treatment (WRT): Exactly the same as SRT, but now with the ﬁlled out report sheet in hand, the student
went back to table A, gave the report sheet to the experimenter and received the chocolate if a white toss was reported.
Table C is therefore not used (see Fig. A1, Appendix).
• Verbal Reported Treatment (VRT): Exactly the same as WRT, but now the student did not have to ﬁll out the report sheet
(only report gender) and had to inform the experimenter verbally about the outcome of the coin toss.
We ran the experiment with 90 participants in each country. There were 10 students for each treatment and this was
repeated three times: 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 (SRT), 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 (SRT), 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 (SRT). We started
each treatment with ten chocolates on a plate on table B (VRT and WRT) or table C (SRT). When we  changed the treatment we
reﬁlled the chocolates taken by the participants and registered the exact number of chocolates replaced4. At the beginning
of each treatment we started with ten chocolates in the plate. At the end of the experiment we compared the numbers in
our records with the reports by the participants. In WRT  and SRT participants wrote the color on the report sheet. In VRT
participants only wrote the gender. In this case, when participants gave us the report sheet and told us the color we  tore
a little corner of the report sheet when they told us black so at the end we  could know how many blacks and whites were
declared.
Note that, as we kept no names or individual-speciﬁc records, we  had to be very careful about whether someone returned.
Experimenters were instructed to inform anyone who tried to return to ﬂip the coin again that it was only possible to
participate once. In case, faculty members showed up for participation, it was emphasized that it was intended to be a
student event. Completing the experiment took about a minute or two.
3. Results
3.1. Differences by treatments
To our great surprise, overall only 57% of the participants reported white across all three treatments and countries. Since
the probability of obtaining white is 50%, this result indicates that 86% resisted the temptation to lie [100% − 2(57%–50%)].
We conclude that little dishonesty is observed across all countries and treatments. Looking at the different treatments, the
degree of dishonest behavior, listed as the percentage of white outcomes, conﬁrms our initial conjectures. We  observe a
greater amount of lying in the SRT, with WRT  in the middle, and with VRT having the smallest amount of lying.
62% (SelfRT) > 57% (WrittenRT) > 53% (VerbalRT)
The differences between SRT and WRT  are not statistically signiﬁcant (2 = .316; p-value = .574), although the average
across the sixteen societies were 5 percentage points higher for the former. However, using a contingency table (Pearson
2) the difference between SRT and VRT was larger (9 percentage points) and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (2 = 4.479; p-
value = 0.034). Further, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant differences between WRT  and VRT (2 = 2.422; p-value = 0.120). Thus,
comparing the different treatments we ﬁnd that the verbal reports are likely to be less prone to dishonest behavior than
written reports in line with previous literature (Bandura et al., 1996; Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Mazar et al., 2008) and
we further ﬁnd that self-reporting the answers (and not having to deliver it to the experimenter) increases this effect.
3 A few students asked why  the coin-chocolate event was carried out. Our prepared explanation was that the purpose was to understand the students’
interest for chocolates. This statement was intentionally made imprecise, such that students did not think this was  a test but rather saw it as a chocolate
promotion (we  never said it was a Lindt promotion).
4 Note that having more or less chocolates on the plates is not an issue for participants as they never get to know the total. What they see (on the plate)
is  the only reference they have.
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Table  2
Results by condition and country.
Country Self-Report (SRT)
(n = 30 p/t)
Written Reported
(WRT)
(n = 30 p/t)
Verbal Reported
(VRT)
(n = 30 p/t)
All
(n = 90)
Austria 40% 77%*** 60% 59%*
Belgium 57% 47% 53% 52%
Colombia 57% 67%** 43% 56%
Denmark 70%** 43% 40% 51%
Finland 63%* 67%** 53% 61%**
Germany 73%*** 50% 53% 59%*
Greece 60% 60%** 37% 52%
India  47% 67% 50% 54%
Indonesia 60% 57% 40% 52%
Italy  60% 47% 57% 54%
Japan  57% 60% 57% 58%*
Netherlands 67%** 60% 50% 59%*
Spain  77%*** 67%** 63%* 69%***
Turkey 53% 67%** 57% 59%*
USA 70%** 53% 63%* 62%**
UK 63%* 33% 70%** 56%
Notes: Columns show the percentages of participants who have taken chocolates in each treatment (denoted “p/t”).
* p-value < 0.10.
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*** p-value < 0.01.
.2. Differences by countries
A second important result is that we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant differences across the 16 countries across any treat-
ent: SRT (2 = 16.953; p-value = 0.322); VRT (2 = 15.691; p-value = 0.403) and WRT  (2 = 22.674; p-value = 0.091). This
uggests that there is a high level of homogeneity in behavior across our sample countries.
Additional interesting results show up from a closer examination of the data. Since tossing a coin follows a binomial
istribution, we looked for those countries where there is an anomalous number of white (awarded) coins reported. Table 2
eports detailed information by country and treatments.5 At the country level, the share of whites reported in excess of 50%
across all treatments), is signiﬁcant (at a 5% signiﬁcance level) in three out of sixteen countries. Yet, the overall country
evel effects can mask underlying effects at the treatment level. We  therefore focus on the treatment effects at the country
evel. Obviously a sample size of 30 per treatment allows us only to make rough assessment of the degree of cheating, but
e still believe this rough measure provides a useful comparison across countries and treatments.6
Result from the Self-report treatment (SRT) is displayed in Fig. 1. In SRT we ﬁnd that the null hypothesis of honest behavior
s rejected for a number of countries. This ﬁgure shows that UK and Finland reject the null at  ˛ = 10% (dotted line labeled with
). Most importantly, Germany and Spain reject at  ˛ = 1% (continuous line labeled with ***). Finally, Netherlands, Denmark
nd the US reject for 1% <  ˛ < 10%.
Fig. 2 displays data from Table 2 for the written and the verbal treatments. Blue (left side) bars in Fig. 2 refer to WRT
written). The number of countries that reject the null is reduced to six and they are not the same as in SRT: Colombia,
inland, Turkey and India reject at 1% <  ˛ < 10% while Austria does so at  ˛ = 1%. Spain weakly rejects (  ˛ = 10%). Data from VRT
verbal) are shown in the red bars (right side) of Figure 2. Only two  countries appear signiﬁcant: Spain rejects at 1% <  ˛ < 10%
hile the UK rejects at the 1% level. The US weakly rejects (  ˛ = 10%).
There are some interesting issues to emphasize: Spain also rejected the null in all treatments. Unexpectedly UK appears
nder the verbal and the self-reported treatment but not in the written. The latter case is exactly the complementary of
ustria which appears in the written case only. Also the US and Finland appear in two treatments. It is also important to
emark that Belgium, Greece, Italy, Indonesia and Japan never appear as dishonest.7 Although it is interesting to note that
hese difference at the condition level do not aim at explaining each country-speciﬁc effects, we simply want to highlight
hat besides our overall conclusion of no signiﬁcant across-country effects, we  do observe some variation in the data.5 We have also conducted a Logit analysis to explain the outcome of individual coin tosses. In the regression, among other factors, we controlled for
ifferent income levels across countries (with the help of per-capita GNI) and for country-level per-capita cocoa consumption. While income does not
eem  to have a signiﬁcant impact, per-capita cocoa consumption has a negative effect on cheating, i.e. the higher the per-capita consumption the lower is
heating.
6 We also conduct the analysis by using Inglehart-Welzel cultural categories (based on the World Value Surveys). Again we do not ﬁnd any robust effect
f  culture on cheating behavior.
7 It is also interesting the case of Denmark. Signiﬁcant differences for SRT vs. WRT  (2 = 4.344; p-value = 0.037) and VRT (2 = 5.445; p-value = 0.020) are
ound.
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Fig. 1. Percentage of chocolates taken in the SRT. *p-value < 0.10; ***p-value < 0.01.Fig. 2. Percentage of chocolates taken in the WRT  and VRT. *p-value < 0.10; ***p-value < 0.01.
3.3. Gender differences
On an exploratory basis, we also analyzed the effect of gender (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a review). Although
previous studies have found correlations between gender and cheating (e.g., Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Fosgaard et al.,
2013), no statistically signiﬁcant differences between the countries were found for the male (2 = 15.898; p-value = 0.389) or
for female (2 = 10.679; p-value = 0.775) participants in line with very recent studies (Abeler et al., 2014). Analyzing by treat-
ment, no differences were found in the SRT [(2 = 16.374; p-value = 0.358) (2 = 17.051; p-value = 0.316)], WRT  [(2 = 19.872;
p-value = 0.177) (2 = 19.341; p-value = 0.199)] or the VRT [(2 = 8.581; p-value = 0.898) (2 = 12.618; p-value = 0.632)] treat-
ments. Clearly, studying gender further reduces data size and our lack of results could be due to this. Our results indicate
that that males and females do not behave differently in our sample.
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Table  3
Pearson correlations of the four indexes with the three treatments.
BSI 2011
(11 countries)
PCI 2012
(16 countries)
GCB 2013
(14 countries)
AOC 2014
(16 countries)
SRT 0.057 −0.334 −0.590** −0.096
p-value 0.868 0.205 0.026 0.725
WRT  0.232 0.317 0.340 0.115
p-value 0.492 0.231 0.235 0.673
VRT −0.483 −0.381 −0.339 −0.336
p-value 0.132 0.146 0.236 0.203
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Cotes: (.) indicates the number of countries in the sample. Some countries of our sample are missing in the BSI (Austria, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
reece)  and in the GCB (Austria, Netherlands); p-value is 2-tailed.
** p-value < 0.05.
.4. Comparison with other evidence of unethical behavior
The analysis of our result can be complemented with a comparison of the (published) rankings of corruption. Note that the
ink between cheating and corruption has been reported as strong (Magnus et al., 2002). Therefore, we  have tested whether
ur experimental data correlate with any of the following international corruption indexes from Transparency International
nd WJR  Rule of Law Index: i.e. the BSI 2011: Bribery Paying Index (from Transparency International);  the PCI 2012: Perception
f corruption Index; the GCB 2013: Global Corruption Barometer (average of all sectors) and AOC2014: Absence of corruption.8
able 3 summarizes all the correlations (12 comparisons: 4 indices × 3 treatments), for the countries in our sample that are
lso represented in the indices.
As shown in Table 3, only one correlation is statistically signiﬁcant (GCB2013 vs. SRT; p < 0.05). On top of that, the sign of
he correlations do not follow any pattern: we get 7 negatives and 5 positives. We  can safely say that international indices
ndicative of institutional honesty are not correlated with our experimental data.
As a further robustness check we also analyzed the relation between the behavior in the experiments and answers to the
orld value surveys questions about morality attitude.9 We ﬁnd that neither the answer of individual item (all p > 0.100)
or the average (p = 0.179) of them is correlated with our experimental evidence.
. Conclusions
Why  people cheat and how it varies across cultures is an important policy question. Most of the studies regarding
his have focused on institutional dishonesty (or corruption). However, whether institutional honesty directly maps into
ts citizens (innate) honesty has not been explored. Note that, while institutional honesty is a function of its (self) rules,
ndividual honesty is much more primal, and hence different from its more popular counterpart, i.e. institutional honesty.
nterestingly, there is little work in this regard. This papers attempts to study citizen’s honesty in a multi-country study. To
ur knowledge this is the ﬁrst study of this kind due to the span of countries and the incentivized mechanism used.
Most studies on institutional honesty rely on non-incentivized self-reported surveys. In our study, we use chocolates as
n incentive and temptation device. The reward is announced and is the main motivator to prospective participants in our
xperiment. They hope to win a chocolate by taking part in the experiment. This self selection also implies that they have
 preference for the reward and have fallen for the “temptation of winning a chocolate.” By using this mechanism we  thus
tudy the innate tendency to lie amongst citizens of 16 countries.
Our main ﬁnding is that there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences across our sample countries regarding their
onesty levels. In fact we observe a high level of honesty and some important culture-speciﬁc interactions. Recall that in
ur task we compare honest behavior across countries when subjects can report the outcome under three conditions, i.e.
elf, Written or Verbal. We  argue that these three conditions differ in terms of the moral weight of lying. That is, under Self
eporting and no interaction with the experimenter, the moral weight of lying is the least, meanwhile, it increases as we
ove from the Verbal to the Written condition.
Overall, we do ﬁnd support for our initial hypothesis in that there is greater deception under the Self reporting condition
ollowed by Written and Verbal. However, we observe no differences across countries. Our lack of results in this regard could
e due to the smaller data size at the treatment level in each country. We  have additionally looked whether we observe
igniﬁcant differences across countries by grouping the according to common characteristics (i.e. European, Asian, etc.).
gain we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences across our sample countries. Finally, though handicapped by even smaller number
f observations, we do not ﬁnd any gender differences across the three conditions or countries.
As mentioned earlier we measure the innate tendency of citizens to cheat and would like to stress that this is very different
rom studying institutional honesty. Our results should not be confounded with those studying institutional honesty as the
8 Note that, countries were ordered from least to most corrupt for all indices for the analysis.
9 Justiﬁable: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties; Justiﬁable: Claiming government beneﬁts to which you are not entitled; Justiﬁable:
heating on taxes if you have a chance; Justiﬁable: Avoiding a fare on public transport; Justiﬁable: Stealing property.
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factors that determine one are different from the other. Further, the kind of cheating we study is instinctive. That is, subjects
do not get time to deliberate their actions. The same applies to their participation in the experiment. That is, we explicitly
state the reward and hence expect that we attract participants that have an afﬁnity toward chocolate consumption. Given
this, the high levels of honesty we observe across countries is indeed surprising. Further, our results show that apparently
this is true across our sample countries.
We  look at the side of citizens and not at the supply side of corruption in the private and public sector of the economy.
Survey studies suffer from empirical issues such as confounding factors and hypothetical biases that are inherent in ques-
tionnaires (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Further, reliable data on issues such as corruption, dishonesty, cheating, etc. are hard
to come by. It is in this context that the experimental methodology is very useful. We  tested ordinary citizens’ behavior,
as opposed to subjective perceptions of national institutions. Importantly, however, our data suggest that ordinary citizens
are much more honest than implied by surveys focused on national institutions. Perhaps it is the corrupting nature of these
institutions that is reﬂected in these survey studies, but not the corruption of the average citizen. The lack of connection
between the supply of corruption and the honesty of individual citizens also requires further inquiry. Our results suggest
that the variation in honesty across countries is not correlated with corruption indices, opening questions about the account-
ability of private and public institutions and the poor connection with the citizens’ behavior and preferences for honesty in
their private decision. Our results clearly show the need for further incentivized and controlled experiments to explore the
issue of ordinary citizens’ honesty across countries.
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